Bruno Alla reports:
An unauthenticated attacker can defeat Django's
"DATA_UPLOAD_MAX_MEMORY_SIZE" limit and force a worker process to allocate
arbitrary memory, by naming a compression codec in the Content-Type charset
parameter. A 108-byte request body produces a 50,331,648-character value inside
the view, an amplification factor of 466,033, and grows process peak RSS by
about 97 MiB. No application configuration is required beyond DRF's default
parser set; the endpoint only has to accept a JSON body.
Deleting an authentication token through "TokenProxy" silently
deletes nothing. The call raises no exception and reports success, the database
row survives, and the token keeps authenticating. Any application, admin
integration or operational script that revokes credentials by calling
".delete()" on a "TokenProxy" instance believes it has revoked a token that is
still live.
DRF's content negotiation parses each Accept token several times per
request and never limits the number of tokens or their total size. Each parse
ends up in Django's parse_header_parameters, which takes quadratic time when a
quoted parameter value is packed with semicolons. On my machine a single GET
with a 780KB Accept header made of 96 such tokens kept one gunicorn worker busy
for 18.87 seconds (Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0,
Python 3.13, Docker on macOS). The header is syntactically valid, fits inside
gunicorn's default header limits, and needs no authentication. Two concurrent
requests, which is one per sync worker, made a default two worker deployment
stop answering for my whole 40 second test window. It recovered half a second
after I stopped sending.