The Immich project reports:
- An attacker-chosen OAuth state cookie allows forced account
linking and takeover of any account, bypassing the fix for
CVE-2025-43856.
- A malicious or intercepted server can read, exfiltrate and
delete arbitrary local files through the duplicate check of the
command line client.
- An external library import follows symbolic links, which
allows arbitrary files to be read.
- Unsanitized EXIF make, model and lens model allow path
traversal in the storage template engine.
- An unanchored regular expression allows the allowedHosts
protection of plugins to be bypassed completely.
- A shared link ignores the "Show metadata" setting on metadata
searches, which leaks EXIF and GPS data.
- An upload through a shared link runs as the link owner, so the
owner check of the live photo video can never fail.
- Metadata of other owners can be written through the duplicate
resolve endpoint.
- Archive downloads through a shared link can include original
files despite the edited asset enforcement.
- A partner can read the metadata of the sharer's locked folder
when a search request omits the visibility, and the archived
timeline metadata as well.
- Read-scoped API keys can reset cluster group people data.
- An unbounded motion photo offset causes memory and disk
exhaustion.
- An uploaded SVG asset allows stored cross-site scripting.
- Email messages allow HTML injection.
- Before 3.2.4, an uploaded SVG file reaches the ImageMagick
coders, which allows code execution on the server
(CVE-2026-105764).
- A share link with uploads disabled can be used to test whether
the owner has a given file.