HTTP-Body project reports:
Multiple vulnerabilities :
- SECURITY, CVE-2026-117500: the suffix of an upload's filename is
worked out from its last 255 bytes only, only when $file_temp_suffix
is unset, and for the default $basename_regexp by a string search
instead of the regexp; a filename of many dots ending in a backslash
made the default $basename_regexp take time quadratic in its length
(7 s per part at the 32 KiB header limit, once per part) in the
default configuration
- SECURITY, CVE-2026-117501: a chunked body is framed line by line with
a limit on the chunk-size line ($HTTP::Body::max_chunk_line_size,
1024 bytes), chunk data is passed on as it arrives instead of being
held until the chunk is complete, malformed framing (a line that is
no chunk-size line, a size that does not fit an integer, chunk data
not followed by CRLF) croaks instead of buffering forever, and
nothing after the trailer or after the body parser is done is kept
- SECURITY, CVE-2026-121006: the trailer of a chunked body is limited
to $HTTP::Body::max_trailer_size bytes (32768) and
$HTTP::Body::max_trailer_lines header lines (100); everything that
followed the last chunk in the same call to add() was parsed with
HTTP::Headers, which takes time quadratic in the number of fields of
one name (6 s for 16 KiB of "a:" lines)