FreeBSD VuXML: Documenting security issues in FreeBSD and the FreeBSD Ports Collection

openvoxdb -- An authenticated node can write another node's factset through the PuppetDB facts terminus

Affected packages
openvoxdb-terminus8 < 8.18.1
openvoxdb-terminus9 < 9.2.1

Details

VuXML ID 15b98472-e624-11f1-9eae-18cf5efc6bb4
Discovery 2026-11-19
Entry 2026-11-22

The OpenVoxProject reports:

Let’s do a quick refresher on the lifecycle of OpenVox facts.

When the agent starts a run, it generates facts and sends them to the server along with the catalog request. The server combines them with trusted information from the agent’s SSL certificate and uses them during compilation. It also caches these facts in OpenVoxDB where they can be used for other purposes; dashboards, OpenBolt target lists, puppetdb_query() calls, etc.

Outside of regular catalog compilation, agents can update their own cached facts using the /puppet/v3/facts endpoint. The flaw fixed in this release is that OpenVoxDB was not validating that the factset being stored with this endpoint actually represented the agent submitting the facts!

Now, to be clear, this doesn’t directly affect classification or Hiera lookups. Those will always use the fresh factset submitted by the agent. What is affected is any classification using or gated behind puppetdb_query() calls or any OpenBolt plans that use a puppetdb_query() or OpenBolt tasks that use PQL to select a list of targets. This would also affect any custom administration tooling that used facts from OpenVoxDB.

In particular, this could lead to administrative actions intended for one node actually executing on another node, which a skilled attacker could leverage via social engineering to achieve privilege escalation.

References

URL https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvoxdb/security/advisories/GHSA-859m-7qpm-85p7