1. SECURITY FIX: When constructing paths of objects being archived, a buffer
could overflow by one byte upon encountering 1024, 2048, 4096, etc. byte
paths. Theoretically this could be exploited by an unprivileged user whose
files are being archived; I do not believe it is exploitable in practice,
but I am offering a $1000 bounty for the first person who can prove me wrong:
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2015-08-21-tarsnap-1000-exploit-bounty.html
2. SECURITY FIX: An attacker with a machine's write keys, or with read keys
and control of the tarsnap service, could make tarsnap allocate a large
amount of memory upon listing archives or reading an archive the attacker
created; on 32-bit machines, tarsnap can be caused to crash under the
aforementioned conditions.